Many supporters of EU funds for military research are convinced that this PA and following European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) will contribute to increase European autonomy of decision and action, and to open space for further EU integration in defence matters. However the minimal conditions for such move to happen are not met, and it is most likely that the PA will not live up to its supporters’ expectations:

1. In the absence of an EU defence policy frame and common strategy, there cannot be a coherent development of capabilities

➢ Beyond the usual limits of the Common Policy on Security and Defence (unanimity, national interests, limited role of the EU institutions), there is no common and coherent 'planning process': according to experts, before starting to fund military research many steps are to be taken, from a strategic planning phase (a common vision and ambition about threats, strategy and level of autonomy) to a programming phase (agreement on the capability needs), an apportioning phase (who does what among MS) and finally an implementation phase including a budgetary strategy, a procurement strategy and a research strategy (see EP study on the future of EU defence research, p.33);

➢ None of those steps have been taken forward, apart from an EDA ‘capability development plan’ coming out of the blue: since 2013, EU member states issued ‘nice’ Council Conclusions but failed to take any concrete political steps except for taking advantage of the EU budget;

➢ the EU Global Strategy may appear as a first step, but its translation into a concrete common ambition and planning on defence, including military implications, will be a very uncertain long process: profound geopolitical divergences between Members are still predominant, not to say about national industries’ competition (see below);

➢ equipment capacities are only one part of capabilities, and are useless without a common policy frame to make strategic decisions; in other words who will be deciding how, when and where to use those equipments?

2. Power rivalries, divergent views and industrial competition between Member States are and will remain the rule

➢ The EP study on the Future of European Defence Research shows that in time of crisis and budget constrains, joint research projects between EU MS have declined much more than the global decrease, instead of looking for economy of scale and more efficiency;

➢ National industries regularly compete to get deals both within and outside the EU, and the military sector is very much considered as national sovereignty where the EU should not have a say. So far, the main cooperation projects happened ad-hoc (and not necessarily all successful) and EDA’s projects are criticised (see fact-sheet 2);

➢ Pretending that starting from the bottom and putting the money first will “oblige” states to cooperate and will “naturally /spontaneously” lead to more integration is not convincing: the EU history demonstrated repeatedly that this does not work when political will is an obstacle; And the top-down approach is even more crucial when it comes to developing military capacities, which is not a “normal business”.

3. the arms and technologies developed thanks to EU public money will then be sold to third countries with insufficient control of exports and end-use

➢ the lack of political frame and strategic planning will make this funding mainly a form of subsidy to the arms industry (see fact-sheet 2), while the positive impact on growth and jobs is far from being proven (see fact-sheet 4);

➢ the arms industry increasingly relies on arms exports outside the EU for profits, and technology or even plant production transfers are more and more often part of the arms deals (see fact-sheet 2);

➢ the EU Common Position on arms exports control is poorly implemented by MS and economic interests prevail over peace and human rights; many Member States allow arms exports to countries far from respecting international law, and some may even be our future enemies (just take the Saudi Arabia example);

➢ the trend is towards a liberalisation of the arms trade under cover of universalisation of exports control rules, and this will rather have a negative impact on security, peace and human rights as stated by UN expert Alfred de Zayas

To conclude, the Preparatory Action puts the cart much before the horse:
Member States are trying to “have the cake and it too”, by using the EU budget without giving up any portion of their national sovereignty.
Second, prioritising industrial strengthening out of any strategic planning is a very dangerous proposal: it is like having a race car moving forward with no driver in the seat.